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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
CANNOT BE USED TO REWRITE A CONTRACT. A PARTY CANNOT 
VIOLATE AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AS A MATTER 
OF LAW WHEN THAT PARTY IS RELYING UPON THE EXPRESS 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT. 
A. THE COURT CANNOT REWRITE THE CONTRACT 
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF RELYING UPON THE 
COVENANT OF FAIR DEALING. 
PDQ in its brief asserts that the Appellant Huber has inappropriately framed the 
issue on appeal. Counsel for Huber respectfully submits that such a characterization is 
disingenuous but nonetheless does bring in focus one of the inherent problems with the trial 
court's decision. Can a party to a contract violate an implied covenant of good faith as a 
matter of law when that party is relying upon the express provisions of their contract. The 
answer is clearly no. Heiner v. J J. Groves and Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990). 
This court is familiar with the reality that the successful party at the trial level is often 
requested to prepare the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This is why 
the often quoted statement "history is written by the winners not the losers" is particularly 
apropos to the practice of law. It is also the reason why this court strives to review these 
matters with the ultimate end in mind to accomplish justice. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: "It is the purpose of the law, and of the court in administering it, to do justice and 
to look through form to substance when necessary to accomplish that purpose" Dixon v. 
Stoddard. 627 P.2d 83, 87 (Utah 1981) cited in Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 
P.2d 967, 968 (Utah App. 1989). This court has also held that "labels" ascribed by the trial 
court are not as important as the description (functions) given by the court in defining the 
meaning in the context of a given case. Udv v. Udv. 893 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah App. 1995). 
1 
This is why the Appellant identified one of the issues raised in this appeal as being 
the inherent inconsistency of finding that he could be acting in bad faith merely relying upon 
the contract terms. See pp. 27-29 of Appellant's Brief. 
The Appellant Huber agrees with the Appellee's statement that Utah law implies a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contractual relationship. However, the 
notion that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be used to rewrite a 
contract has been rejected in Utah, but this is exactly what the trial court has done in this 
case. Judge Bench summarized this principle and the Utah case law on point in his 
concurring and dissenting opinion in Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food 
& Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 463 (Utah App. 1994): 
A covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres to most contractual 
relationships by operation of law. See Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 
55 (Utah 1991); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 
199 (Utah 1991); Scare v. University of Utah Sch. of Medicine, 822 P.2d 673, 
678 (Utah App 1994). The purpose of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is to insure that neither party will "intentionally or purposely do 
anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the 
fruits of the contract" St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 199; accord Bastion v. Cedar 
Hills Inv. & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981). 
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not, however, be used 
to create a duty that is inconsistent with express terms of the contract. In 
Brehany, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Under the implied covenant of good faith . . . the parties of a 
contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract 
should be construed in a manner which assumes the parties 
intended that the duties and rights created by the contract 
should be performed and exercised in good faith. Such a 
covenant cannot be construed, however, to establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. Nor 
can a covenant of good faith be used to nullify a right granted by 
a contract to one of the parties or to require a party vested with a 
contract right to exercise that right in a manner contrary to that 
party's legitimate self-interest. 
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Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55 (emphasis added). The supreme court further stated 
that "[n]o obligation can be implied . . . which would be inconsistent with the 
other terms of the contractual relationship.11 Id. (quoting Murphy v. American 
Home Prod., 58 N.Y.2d 293,461 N.Y.S.2d 232,237,448 N.E.2d 86,91 (1983)); 
accord Rio Algom Corp v. Jimco Ltd, 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
Similarly, in Seare, 882 P.2d at 678, the court of appeals stated: 
Although contracts are subject to implied covenants of good 
faith, such covenants " 'cannot be construed . . . to establish 
new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the 
parties: " Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 308 
(Utah 1992) (quoting Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 
55 (Utah 1991)). Thus, these covenants are implied in contracts 
"to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract. 
. ." Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 
CaLRptr. 211, 232, 765 P.2d 373, 394 (1988)). 
Judge Greenwood, writing for the court, explained in Seare that where there 
are no express covenants or promises in a contract compelling a party to the 
contract to act in a particular manner, "there could be no implied covenants 
or promises to do the same." Id 882 P.2d at 678-79. 
In Ted R Brown and Associates v. Carries Corp., 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 
1988), Judge Jackson likewise rejected the notion that the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing can be used to rewrite a contract. 
It is a fundamental that every contract imposes a duty on the parties to 
exercise their contractual rights and perform their contractual obligations 
reasonably and in good faith. Nonetheless, a court may not make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for themselves; furthermore, a 
court may not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself. 
M[I]t cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law that, whenever 
one party to a contract can show injury flowing from the exercise of a contract 
right by the other, a basis for relief will be somehow devised by the courts." 
Id at 970-71 (quoting Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 464 
(Utah 1978) (citations omitted)). 
In Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc. 560 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court examined how a court should interpret 
and enforce an implied covenant: 
An implied covenant must rest entirely on the presumed 
intention of the parties as gathered from the terms as actually 
expressed in the written instrument itself, and it must appear 
that it was so clearly within the contemplation of the parties 
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that they deemed it unnecessary to express it and therefore 
omitted to do so; or it must appear that it is necessary to infer 
such a covenant in order to effectuate the full purpose of the 
contract as a whole as gathered from the written instrument It 
is not enough to say that an implied covenant is necessary in 
order to make the contract fair, or that without such a covenant 
it would be improvident or unwise, or that the contract would 
operate unjustly. It must arise from the presumed intention of 
the parties as gathered from the instrument as a whole. 
Id. at 703 (quoting Percoffv. Solomon, 67 So.2d 31, 40 (Ala. 1953)). (pp. 463-
464) 
The Appellant Huber would respectfully submit that as a matter of law he cannot be 
found to be acting in bad faith when relying upon the express terms of the contract. He 
waited to tender his performance until PDQ tendered its performance. In this case, the real 
estate agent assisting the parties drafted a contract which failed to specify a time of 
performance with respect to: 1) the removal of the underground tanks; and 2) Huber's 
obligation to provide the environmental clearance. The contract also failed to specify when 
the $4,000.00 deposit to pay for the out-of-pocket expenses for the environmental testing was 
to be paid by the buyer. The contract further failed to identify that the removal of the 
underground storage tanks was a condition precedent to obtaining financing. In fact, it 
provided just the opposite. Subject to the deemed qualification, the boiler plate/standard 
provisions of the REPC contract by implication provided that the financing was prerequisite 
before the seller was obligated to remove the underground storage tanks. (See paragraph 
2.2 appraisal of property to qualify for financing in present condition.) 
Obviously it makes little sense for the seller to go to the time and effort of opening 
up his parking lot to remove the underground storage tanks let alone potentially exposing 
himself to thousands of dollars of cleanup costs (without the funds to pay the same) if the 
buyer cannot perform the contract, i.e. obtain financing. Conversely, it makes little sense 
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for the buyer to go to the time and effort of obtaining financing if the property cannot be 
used for its intended purpose because of environmental problems. The role of the courts 
is to interpret the contract not rewrite a poorly drafted contract. The parties entered into 
a circular agreement (with the assistance of a licensed real estate agent) but failed to specify 
which performance was contingent upon the other. Each waited for the other to perform. 
Each was totally within their rights to do so until the other tendered their performance -
which never occurred. See Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Ut. App. 1989) and discussion 
at pp. 31-34 of brief of Appellant. 
The trial court after hearing the evidence determined that the Appellant Huber was 
acting in bad faith because he failed to remove the underground storage tanks in a timely 
fashion and yet the contract failed to state when this event was to occur. (Ironically when 
PDQ failed to tender the $4,000.00 deposit until November 15 less than 15 days before the 
permits expired and during the middle of winter yet it was not acting in bad faith.) 
Testimony was received which PDQ relies heavily upon to the effect that Huber could1 
remove the underground storage tanks within a relatively short period of time. This 
commitment was never placed into the contract and any reliance upon oral statements such 
as this runs contrary to the express provisions of the contract which states: 
14. Complete Contract. This instrument together with its addendas, any 
attached exhibits, and Seller's disclosures constitutes the entire contract 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior 
negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings, or contracts between 
the parties. This contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of 
the parties. 
Without attempting any sarcasm the Appellant would observe that there is a distinct difference between 
ncould* and nwoulcT — neither however is part of the written contract 
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Huber had obtained a permit to remove the tanks which expired at the end of 
November. Huber testified that he was waiting upon a commitment that financing was in 
place before he removed the underground storage tanks. He also testified he was waiting 
to receive the non-refundable $4,000.00 deposit to pay for out-of-pocket expenses that PDQ 
acknowledged he had bargained for. The trial court determined this to be acting in bad 
faith. There is other evidence which the court received to the effect that Huber wanted 
financial contribution from a previous landowner but this is irrelevant because as a matter 
of law if Huber was relying on what the contract expressly provided for, what was bargained 
for, then he was totally within his legal rights to do so and the trial court could not as a 
matter of law rewrite the contract to require more. Brehanv v. Nordstroms. Inc.. 812 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1991); Woodland Theatres. Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres. Inc.. 560 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1977); Seare v. University of Utah Sch. of Medicine. 882 P.2d 673, 678 (Utah App. 
1994); Ted R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Appellant Huber respectfully submits that the trial court committed reversible 
error because as a matter of law simply relying upon the express terms of the contract 
(which the parties negotiated with the assistance of a licensed real estate agent) he maintains 
he was within his rights and was not acting in bad faith. 
B. TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. 
The Appellant would respectfully submit that when neither party tendered their 
respective performance at closing the contract terminated by its own terms. In Ujdur v. 
Thompson. 126 Idaho 6, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (Ct. App. 1994) the Court of Appeals of Idaho 
stated: 
It is well settled that where no time for performance is established in the 
agreement, the law implies that performance must occur within a reasonable 
time. However, a different rule applies to the parties1 contract where time is 
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deemed, expressly or implicitly, to be "of the essence." Thus, where the 
parties make time of the essence in setting a deadline for payment, [or 
performance] strict compliance with such deadline is required. 
In this case, the parties expressly agreed to a "cutoff date" of July 8, 1992. 
Their agreement provided that Thompson would have "through and including 
the cutoff date" to pay Ujdur a specified amount, and that "If [Thompson] 
does not pay said amount by or on the cutoff date, [Thompson] shall deliver 
to [Ujdur] his quitclaim deed." We conclude, as did the district court, that by 
this language the parties manifested their intent to make time of the essence 
of their agreement. Accord Butler, 42 Idaho at 309, 246 P. at 315; see also 
Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180, 438 P.2d 925 (1968) (in option contract, 
time stated for exercise of an option is of the essence, and no express 
provision stating that time "is of the essence" need be contained therein). 
Consequently, Thompson's tender of payment made after the July 8 cutoff 
date may not be considered in determining whether there was substantial 
performance, (emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 21 of the parties' contract states that "time is of the essence". 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant Huber would respectfully submit that the contract entered into by the 
parties with the assistance of the licensed real estate agent provided for conditions 
concurrent and that neither party could be found to be in breach of the contract until the 
other party had tendered performance and that as a matter when the parties failed to tender 
within the time frame specified for closing, the contract terminated by its own terms; that 
as a matter of law neither party could be determined to have breached the contract. The 
contract simply expired by its own terms. 
Respectfully submitted this py day of August, 199X 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS^-A-^ 
OSEPH M. CTIAMBf 
Attorney for Appellant 
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